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ARTICLE 177 REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN

COURT
VLADIMIR SHIFRIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
In many ways the most important aspect of the work of the European Court of Justice (ECJ or Court of Justice) is its jurisdiction to give
"preliminary rulings" under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome'. Disputes involving Community law never come directly before the Court of
Justice, but rather before the courts and tribunals of the Member
States. Treaty provisions enable the Court of Justice to rule on questions of Community law, which arise in such litigation. 2 The system of
"preliminary rulings" has proved a particularly effective means of securing rights claimed under Community law. 3 The term "preliminary
ruling" is somewhat of a misnomer. The ruling is requested and given
in the course of proceedings before the national court. 4 It is therefore
an interlocutory ruling, a step in the proceeding before the national
court. 5 The effect is that any question of Community law in an issue be-

Vladimir Shifrin is currently a third year law student at the University of Denver
College of Law, and a 1989 graduate of the University of Colorado at Denver, B.S, Business Information Systems Analysis, Management and Design.
1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, U.J. (C224) 1 (1992),
[1992] (C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
2. Article 177 EEC Treaty provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: the interpretation of this Treaty; the validity and interpretation of
acts of the institutions of the Community; the interpretation of the statutes
of the bodies established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so
provide. Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a
Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on
the question is necessary to enable it to give judgement, request the Court
of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a
case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shallbring the matter before the Court of Justice.
Id. art. 177.
3. See generally NEVILLE BROWN & FRANCIS G. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (3rd ed. 1989).
4. Id. at 172.
5. Id. at 171.
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fore a national court may be authoritatively determined by the Court of
Justice. A national court is in all cases entitled, and in some cases, required to make a reference to the Court; and the Court is the final arbiter on matters of Community law, though the case is heard in a national
forum.6 The need for a system of preliminary rulings can be seen most
7
clearly in relation to questions of validity of Community legislation.
For a national court to declare Community legislation invalid would
lead to intolerable confusion.8 Furthermore, a similar line of reasoning
may apply equally well to questions of interpretation. The applicability
of Community law in a particular case depends as much upon its interpretation as upon its validity. 9 A narrow interpretation of legislation
could be tantamount to holding it invalid, or the actual validity may depend on strict construction. 10 Thus, uniform interpretation of Community law is necessary for uniform application of Community law. 1
Without uniform application, Community law would be liable to frag12
ment and become overlaid by various national legal systems.
This article will examine the implications for Article 177(3) references in light of the holding and analysis by the Court of Justice in Par13
fums ChristianDior SA & Parfumes Christian Dior BV v. Evora BV.
This case re-examined what constitutes a national court whose decisions are final for the purpose of Article 177(3) and solidified the circumstances when such a court must refer to the ECJ for a preliminary
ruling. However, in not following the opinion of the Advocate General
the ECJ missed an opportunity to finally overrule a loophole in the review process first established in CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo Spa v.
4
Ministry of Health.'

6. BROWN & Jacobs, supra note 2 at 172.

7. See id. at 173.
8. See id.
9. Id. at 174.

10. Id.
11. "Article 177 is essential for the preservation of the Community character of the
law established by the Treaty and has the object of ensuring that in all circumstances
this law is the same in all States of the Community." Id. (quoting Case 166/73 Rheinmuhlen [1974] ECR 33 at 38).
12. See id. at 175
13. Case 337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA & Parfumes Christian Dior BV v. Evora
BV, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 4641 [hereinafter Dior].
14. Case 283/81 CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo Spa v. Ministry of Health 1982 ECR
3415, ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1474 [hereinafter CILFI1.
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II.CASE DESCRIPTION
A.

Summary of Facts

Dior 15 commenced proceedings against Evora 16 on the grounds of
trademark infringement. Dior put forth two claims: (1) that the marks
have been used in breach of its exclusive right to use the marks in respect to the same goods in violation of Article 13A of the Uniform
Benelux Law on Trademarks; or, (2) that the marks have been used in
circumstances liable to cause damage by impairing the prestige and image of the marks. 17 Dior further claimed that Evora infringed on its

15. Parfums Christian Dior SA (Dior France) owns the exclusive rights to Eau Sauvage, Poison, Fahrenheit, Svelte, and Dune trademarks in the Benelux countries. The
marks consist of package illustrations for perfume bottles. Additionaly, Dior France
owns the copyright to the packaging and the bottles. The second plaintiff, Parfums
Christian Dior BV (Dior Netherlands) is the exclusive franchisee of Dior France in the
Netherlands. Dior Netherlands uses a selective distribution system to sell the products in
the Netherlands. Selective distribution systems are lawful in the luxury cosmetics sector. Selected retailers can only sell the products to the ultimate consumer or another selected retailer. Selective distribution systems can be justified by the particular nature of
the products: Selective distribution systems constitute an element of competition which
is in conformity with Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty if four conditions are satisfied: first,
that the characteristics of the product in question necessitate a selective distribution system, in the sense that such a system constitutes a legitimate requirement having regard
to the nature of the product concerned, in particular its high quality or technical sophistication, in order to preserve its quality and ensure proper use; second, that resellers are
chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature which are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and not applied in a discriminatory fashion; third, that
the system in question seeks to achieve a result which enhances competition and thus
counterbalances the restriction of competition inherent in selective distribution systems,
in particular as regards price; and fourth, that the criteria laid down do not go beyond
what is necessary. Case T-88/92, Groupement d'achat Edouard Leclerc v. Commission of
the European Communities, 1996 E.C.R., ECJ CELEX LEXIS 4474 1 106 (Ct. First Instance 1996).
16. The defendant, Evora BV (Evora), operates a chain of chemist shops under the
name of its subsidiary Kruidvat. Kruidvat shops are not part of the selected distribution
system, but sell Dior products obtained by parallel imports. Parallel imports are products which are not obtained directly from Dior or its distributors, but which have already
been marketed by Dior or with its consent. Parallel importers purchase products in
batches in Member States where prices are relatively low and import them to sell below
the manufactures official price while still making a profit. In a Christmas promotion in
1993, Kruidvat advertised, without Dior's consent, Eau Sauvage, Poison, Fahrenheit,
Dune and Svelte perfumes, using depictions of the packaging and bottles of those products. Kruidvat carried out the advertising in a manner customary to retailers in the parallel imports sector.
17. Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS
3 (opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs, delivered 29 April 1997) (second indent of the first paragraph of Article 13A of the Benelux
Law entitled a trade mark owner to oppose any other use of the mark or a similar sign,
in circumstances, which in the field of commerce, and without just cause, were liable to
prejudice the trade mark owner).
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copyright regarding bottles and packaging used for its goods.18 Dior
sought an order that Evora "should desist and continue to desist from
making any use of Dior picture trade marks, and from any publication
or reproduction of Diors' products. 19
B.

ProceduralHistory in the Netherlands

The Arrondissementsrechtbank Haarlem (District Court) upheld
Dior's claim and issued an injunction ordering Evora to desist and to
continue to desist from using any of Dior's trademarks in "catalogues,
brochures, advertisement or otherwise, in a manner not conforming to
Dior's customary manner of advertising." 20 The injunction was set aside
on appeal to the Gerechtshof (Regional Court of Appeals), against which
Dior took the matter to Hoge Raad (Supreme Court). 21 In some circumstances requiring interpretation of Benelux Law, the Hoge Raad is required to refer questions to the Benelux Court for a preliminary ruling.22 Hoge Raad decided that questions on the interpretation of the
Uniform Benelux Law on Trade Marks should be referred to the Benelux Court, and questions on Community law should be refereed to the
Court of Justice, and therefore stayed proceedings. 23 The Benelux
Court also stayed its proceedings before it on the grounds that replies to
questions submitted to the Court of Justice will effect its own re24
sponse.
The Court of Justice faced the following procedural question: in
proceedings relating to interpretation of Uniform Benelux Law on

18. See id.
19. See id. 1 7.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. 1 26. The Benelux Court may be asked by any court in the Benelux countries, under Article 6, to rule on a question of interpretation of Benelux law where there
is a difficulty of interpretation and the national court considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgment. By the third paragraph of the same
article, a national court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required to refer to the Benelux court. Article 7(2) of the treaty establishing
the Benelux court provides that the national courts which take decisions subsequently in
the action are bound by the interpretation adopted by the Benelux court. Id.
23. Id. The Benelux Convention on Trade Marks (Benelux Convention) (concluded
between Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) established the Benelux Court,
which is composed of judges of the supreme courts of each of those three States. Article
10 of the Benelux Convention was concluded on 19 March 1962, and Article 6(3), concluded 31 March 1965, established the Benelux Court. Under Article 177(3) of the EC
Treaty, a court of the Member State against whose decisions there is no remedy under
national law is obliged to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. Id.
24. See id.
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Trade Marks and interpretation of Council Directive 89/104/EEC25, is
the highest national court or the Benelux Court to be regarded as the
court against whose decisions there is no remedy under national law
and which is therefore required to refer to the Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling under Article 177.26
C. Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs
The Advocate General first noted that the appeal in the present
case is in the context of an interlocutory proceeding.27 Therefore, neither court is obliged to refer to the Court of Justice, provided that each
party is entitled to continue proceedings on the substance of the case,
and any question decided in the interlocutory proceeding may be the
subject of a future reference to the Court. 28 However, the Advocate
General thought it might be useful to complete the analyses. 29 He
opinioned that interlocutory proceedings before the Benelux Court are a
step in the proceedings before a national court; the answer given by the
Benelux Court is binding on the referring national court; therefore, the
Benelux Court is obligated to refer to the Court of Justice when the
question presented depends on interpretation of Community law. 30 The
only exception the Advocate General envisioned to a mandatory Article
177 reference centers on a lower court, in the same proceeding, already
having made reference on the same question. 31 Simply, a court of a
Member State "whose decisions are final should not decide a question of
Community law" without a ruling from the Court of Justice. 32 The requirements of Article 177(3) will be satisfied so long as the Court of Jus33
tice gives a ruling at some stage of the case.

25. At the time in question the law amending the Benelux Law in light of the First
Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988, to approximate the laws of the
Member States, known as the Trade Mark Directive, had not come into force. However,
where an individual relies on a directive which has not been transposed in the national
legal system within the period laid down, the national rules are to be interpreted, as far
as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive. See Case 91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb, 1994 ECR 1-3325. Furthermore, this rule does not apply as the implementation period expired prior to events giving rise to this action.
26. Id. 1 14.
27. Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS (Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs delivered 29 April 1997).
28. See id.
29. See id. 1 25.
30. Id. 1 27.
31. Id.
32. Id. 1 28.
33. See id.
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D. Court's Holding and Analysis
The court held that both the Benelux Court and the Hoge Raad are
courts "against whose decisions there is no remedy under national
law." 34 Therefore, both must make a reference to the Court of Justice
under Article 177(3), when interpreting Uniform Benelux Law on Trade
Marks in light of First Council Directive to approximate the laws of
Member States relating to trade marks. 35 However, this obligation is
not required when the question is substantially the same as one that
has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in the same na36
tional proceeding.
In starting the analysis on the issue, the Court of Justice first examined whether a supranational court may refer questions for a preliminary ruling, and if so, whether there are circumstances when it
would be obliged to do so. 37 In answering the question presented, the
ECJ began with the premise that the Benelux Court could submit questions for a preliminary ruling. 3 Therefore, as reasoned by the ECJ
there is no good reason why a court, common to a number of Member
States, should not be able to submit questions for a preliminary ruling. 39 The Benelux Court has the task of ensuring that the Benelux
countries uniformly apply the common legal rules. 40 It follows that a
procedure before the Benelux Court is a step in the proceedings before
the national courts, leading to a final interpretation of common legal
rules. 41 Therefore, a national court faced with a task of interpreting
Community legal rules should be allowed to follow the procedure established by Article 177 in order to serve the purposes of that provision. 42
Since the Benelux Court is a court of a Member State, if a question
of Community law is raised in a case, and there is no judicial remedy
against its decision under national law, pursuant to Article 177(3), a
reference for a preliminary ruling must be made to the Court of Justice. 43 This obligation to refer is based on cooperation, and ensures the
proper application of Community law in all Member States. 44 The pur-

34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 19.
38. Id.
20.
39. Id.
21.
40. See id. at 1 22.
41. See id.
42. See id. 1 23 (the purpose of Article 177 is to ensure uniform interpretation of
Community law).
43. See id. 1 24 (a court like the Benelux Court may be under an obligation to refer a
question to the Court of Justice).
44. See id. 1 25. See also CILFIT, 1982 ECR 3415, 1 7.
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pose of Article 177(3) is to prevent the creation of a body of national
case law, that is not in accord with the rules of Community law. 45 The
Court of Justice reasoned that where no appeal is possible against a decision of a supranational court of Member States, the court may be
obliged to make a reference under Article 177(3), where a question of
46
Community law is raised.
However, in the situation faced by the Hoge Raad, it does not follow
that both courts are obliged to make a reference to the Court of Justice. 47 If a substantially the same question has been raised as one that
already has been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case,
the obligation of the ECJ to provide an interpretation may be without
purpose. 48 It follows that if the question raised is the same as a question that has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in the
same national proceedings, the court of last resort is not obliged to refer
the question to the Court of Justice. 49 Therefore, the law does not oblige
the Benelux court to make a reference for a preliminary ruling if the
Hoge Raad has already done so in the same case on the same question.50
However, if the Hoge Raad made no such reference, then a supranational court, like the Benelux Court, is required to submit the question
prior to giving its final judgement. 51 This answer differed slightly from
the response given in the advocate general opinion. The advocate general opinion called for only one exception to requirements of an Article
177(3) reference. 52 The Court of Justice did not follow the Advocate
General opinion in allowing only one exception to requirements of Article 177(3) reference, but instead followed established case law on the issue.

53

45. Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS. See also Case 107/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Centrafarm, 1977 ECR 957, 1 5, ECJ CELEX LEXIS 914.

46. Id.

1 26.

47. See id. 1 28 (a reference by Hoge Raad and the Benelux Court in deciding the
same case is not necessarily required).
48. See id. "According to the established case-law of the Court... the authority of an
interpretation provided by the Court under Article 177 may deprive that obligation of its
purpose and thus empty it of its substance. This is especially so when the question
raised is substantially the same as a question which has already been the subject of a
preliminary ruling in a similar case." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. 1 30.
51. Id.
52. Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1 27 ("[Slince the answer given.., is binding on
the referring court, the Benelux Court is ...obliged to refer when the answer to a question referred depends upon the interpretation of a provision of Community Law. The
only exception would be where the referring court has itself made a reference to this
Court.').
53. See id. See generally Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belastingsadministratie, 1963 ECR 31; CILFIT, 1982 ECR 3415,
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III. ANALYSIS
The Court of Justice has on several prior occasions considered the
definition of a court or tribunal of a Member State under Article 177.
The Court has left itself free to determine the notion of a national court
or tribunal for the purpose of Article 177 only. 54 In the past, to ensure
the ECJ does not deprive itself of the competence to issue preliminary
rulings, the ECJ widely and liberally construed this notion.55 However,
the Court is rather reserved in its analysis of the issue. 56 This case did
not depart from that precedent. The Court simply could have found no
"good reason" why a supranational court should not be able to submit
questions for a preliminary ruling.5 7 Judging by prior case law and this
decision, what constitutes a 'national court' under Article 177 is not the
same as under national laws. 58 Only on one prior occasion did the ECJ
elaborate its views on this issue. 59 In Vaassen, an arbitration tribunal,
established under Dutch law for settling social security disputes, made
a reference to the ECJ. The ECJ considered the nature of the tribunal,
its functions, its jurisdiction, its powers, the rules of procedure, and the
law to be applied. 60 The Court of Justice further stressed the permanent nature of the tribunal and the compulsory jurisdiction of the tribunal. 61 According to case law, it is of no importance whether the referring body is considered a court under national law. 62 Instead, the
decisive factors are rather the judicial functions of the body, application
of procedural rules, and operation within consent of the public. 63 In
64
case of doubt, the Court of Justice will make this decision.
Given past analysis and case law, it is not a surprise that a supranational court of some Member States might be required to make an Article 177 reference. However, in not following the opinion provided by
the Advocate General the court lost an opportunity to close a significant

54. See generally GERHARD BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1981).

55. Id. at 368. See generally Preliminary ruling No. 61/65, [1966] ECR 261 (dealing
with a request for a preliminary ruling from a Dutch social security arbitration panel).
56. Id.
57. Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1 21.
58. BEBR, supra note 54 at 368 (citing Case 61/65 Vaassen v. Beambtenfonds
Mijnbedrif 1966 ECR 280, 281).
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See MADS ANDENAS, ARTICLE 177 REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT-POLICY
AND PRACTICE (1994).

63. Id. at 149.
64. Id.
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loophole in Article 177 review process. Two exceptions created by case
law are available to a court facing the question whether or not a reference should be made to the Court of Justice. 65 The exceptions, acte
eclaire and acte clair, were developed in two judgements of the Court of
66
Justice: Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belastingsadministratie(Da Costa)
and CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo Spa v. Ministry of Health
(CILFIT).67
A. Acte Eclaire
The doctrine of acte eclaire68 allows a court falling under Article
177(3) to be exempt from the obligation to refer where previous decisions of the Court of Justice have already dealt with the point of law in
question. This doctrine applies irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led to those decisions, even though the questions at issue are not strictly identical. 69 This doctrine, clarified by the Court in
Da Costa,70 alleviated the obligation to refer under the condition that it
already interpreted the same provision of Community law. 7 1 In the
opinion of the Court, such a preliminary ruling "may deprive the obligation of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance." 72 "Such is the
case,"reasoned the Court, "when the question raised is materially identical with a question which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case." 73 This language, echoed in the current
case, might be too simple to ensure consistent application of Article 177
review.7 4 The obligation of the courts of last resort is liberalized if they
are trying to interpret the same Community laws provision under
"similar" circumstances] 5 This identification of a "similar" question is
deceptive, offering national courts a loophole, or leading them to a
wrong conclusion.7 6 In the past some courts have taken the requirements of this rule too liberally.7 7 As a result, they did not make a refer65. Id. at 17.
66. Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belastingsadministratie, 1963
ECR 31.
67. CILFIT,1982 ECR 3415, 1 7.
68. "Well informed act."
MARIE-HELENE CORREARD & VALERIE GRUNDY,
CONCISE OXFORD-HACHETTE FRENCH DICTIONARY (1995).

69. ANDENAS supra note 62 (citingCILFIT, 1982 ECR 3415, 3429
70. De Costa, 1963 ECR 31.

THE

14).

71. BEBR, supra note 54, at 511.

72. Id. (citingDa Costa, 1963 ECR 31).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See generally van Boven v. Etat beige, 27 Recueil de jurisprudence du droit administatif et du Conseil d'Etat 287 (1972) (Belgian court deciding whether an unemployment compensation is governed by the provision for equal pay between sexes by using a
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ence to the Court of Justice in instances where they interpreted a provision of similar content of another Community rule.78 This practice becomes a threat to uniformity of Community law if the highest national
courts interpret a provision by analogy with a preliminary ruling interpreting another provision, or by disregarding the preliminary ruling
and interpreting the provision in their own way.7 9 It is doubtful that Da
Costa intended to provide such a wide margin of discretion to national
courts.80 Unfortunately, the Court of Justice in the present case missed
an opportunity to close this loophole for national courts to avoid their
obligation under Article 177(3).81
B. Acte Clair
The doctrine of acte clair 2, derived from French law, subsumes the
acte eclaire and goes beyond it, giving national courts authority to interpret Community law.83 Acte clair exempts national courts from the
requirement of making a reference if the answer to the question presented is sufficiently obvious, even if there is no decision of the ECJ directly on point.84 In CILFIT,85 the Court of Justice spelled out the conditions that must be satisfied before a national court of last instance can
invoke acte clair.8 6 The national court must bear in mind the risk of its
87
decision diverging with prior judicial decisions in the Community.
Furthermore, the national court must be convinced that the matter is
equally obvious to the courts of other Member States and to the Court of
Justice.88 In reaching this conclusion, the national court must consider
"[t]he specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise, and the risk of divergences in

previous preliminary ruling from a case dealing with pension rights); 16 Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebsberaters 230 (1970) (German court deciding whether a special turnover tax on exports is a customs duty, prohibited by Article 12, by using several
preliminary rulings dealing with compensatory taxes pursuant to agriculture regulations); 3 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Erop6en 681-696 (1967) (French court deciding
whether a para-fiscal charge on processing tomatoes infringed Article 91 and 92. The
court held that Article 93 interpretation applies to Article 92, thereby refusing to make a
reference to the ECJ).
78. BEBR, supra note 54, at 512.

79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
See id.
See id.
"Absolutely clear act". CORREARD, supra note 68.

83. ANDENAS, supra note 62, at 18.

84. Id.
85. CILFIT, 1982 ECR 3415 ("... the correct application of Community Law is so
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt").
86. See ANDENAS, supranote 62, at 18
87. Id.
88. Id.
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judicial decisions within the Community."89 In its decision the national
court must look at:
the need to compare the different language versions of Community
legislation, each of which is equally authentic; the issue of terminology
which is peculiar to Community law, or which has a different meaning
in Community law from its meaning in the law of the Member States;
and the need to place every provision of Community law in context and
to interpret it in light of the provisions of Community law as a whole,
regard being had to the objectives of Community law and to its state of
evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied. 90
The strict requirement developed in CILFIT would seem not a relaxation of the duty to refer under Article 177(3), but an attempt to deter national courts from the use of acte clair by setting forth conditions
that no national court could realistically satisfy. 91 However, examples
abound of Member States' supreme courts not making a reference under
Article 177(3) on the grounds of acte clair.92
Even if the national supreme court interprets Community law impeccably, this does not minimize the potential infringement of Article
177(3). 93 In disregarding an obligation under Article 177(3) there is an
ever-present danger that the national court may misinterpret Community law. 94 This is an intolerable situation towards the goal of Article
177: the prevention of a body of national case law that is not in accord
with the rules of Community law from coming into existence in any
Member State. 95 An infringement of Article 177(3) prevents the Court
of Justice from exercising its exclusive jurisdiction to interpret Community law. 96 Acte clair is a serious concern to the uniformity of Community law, if used by supreme national courts as a convenient instrument
for restricting their obligation to refer. 97 Article 177(3) does not degrade
courts of last instance to judicial automation, meaning requiring them
to simply refer questions to the Court of Justice as soon as they occur. 98
Courts of last instance have the discretion to determine whether or not

89. CILFIT, 1982 ECR 3415.
90. ANDENAS, supra note 60, at 18.
91. See id.
92. See generally id. (citing Sixth Annual Report to the European Parliament on
Commission Monitoring of the Application of Community law - 1988, Appendix, 'The Attitude of National Supreme Courts to Community Law", 1989 O.J. (C 330) 146.
93. See BEBR, supra note 54, at 516.
94. Id. at 511.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 518.
98. See id.
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such a question is relevant to the outcome of the case. 99 But this must
to be the limit of their discretion, irrespective of how they may intend to
interpret Community law, even if they consider the rule clear they must
request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice. 100 Acte clair implies a larger margin than the one granted by Article 177(3).101 Finding
that a provision is clear already implies its interpretation, which is exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 0 2 Such a strict interpretation of Article 177 is the only way to ensure uniform interpretation of
Community law. 10 3 In the present case the Court of Justice had the opportunity to close this serious threat to uniform application of Community rules.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this case, the Court of Justice had an opportunity to decisively
rule on the issue of the requirements of an Article 177(3) reference.
However, by not following the opinion of the Advocate General the
Court passed up an opportunity to close loopholes available to national
courts interpreting Community law. The language of the opinion issued
by the Court makes it clear that acte eclaire is still alive and well in
Community case law. By allowing a national court to forgo its obligation to refer when the question raised is materially identical with a
question which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a
"similar case", the court allowed a danger to uniformity of Community
law to remain. If instead, the Court would have followed the language
of the Advocate General opinion only one exception would be available
to the supreme national court.104
The resolution of the acte clair issue is not that clear. The Court of
Justice passed up the opportunity to clearly put the precedent established by CILFIT to rest. It remains to be seen if any national supreme
court will invoke this controversial doctrine in a future case in light of
this holding.

99. See id. at 519.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Dior, 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1 27 ("[S]ince the answer given.., is binding
on the referring court, the Benelux Court is... obliged to refer when the answer to a
question referred depends upon the interpretation of a provision of Community Law.
The only exception would be where the referring court has itself made a reference to this
Court."). Id.

